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A BURGESSIAN CRITIQUE OF NOMINALISTIC
TENDENCIES IN CONTEMPORARY MATHEMATICS
AND ITS HISTORIOGRAPHY
KARIN USADI KATZ AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ0
Abstract. We analyze the developments in mathematical rigor
from the viewpoint of a Burgessian critique of nominalistic recon-
structions. We apply such a critique to the reconstruction of in-
finitesimal analysis accomplished through the efforts of Cantor,
Dedekind, and Weierstrass; to the reconstruction of Cauchy’s foun-
dational work associated with the work of Boyer and Grabiner; and
to Bishop’s constructivist reconstruction of classical analysis. We
examine the effects of an ontologically limitative disposition on
historiography, teaching, and research.
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1. Introduction
Over the course of the past 140 years, the field of professional pure
mathematics (analysis in particular), and to a large extent also its
professional historiography, have become increasingly dominated by a
particular philosophical disposition. We argue that such a disposition
is akin to nominalism, and examine its ramifications.
In 1983, J. Burgess proposed a useful dichotomy for analyzing nom-
inalistic narratives. The starting point of his critique is his perception
that a philosopher’s job is not to rule on the ontological merits of this
or that scientific entity, but rather to try to understand those entities
that are employed in our best scientific theories. From this viewpoint,
the problem of nominalism is the awkwardness of the contortions a
nominalist goes through in developing an alternative to his target sci-
entific practice, an alternative deemed ontologically “better” from his
reductive perspective, but in reality amounting to the imposition of
artificial strictures on the scientific practice.
Burgess introduces a dichotomy of hermeneutic versus revolution-
ary nominalism. Thus, hermeneutic nominalism is the hypothesis that
science, properly interpreted, already dispenses with mathematical ob-
jects (entities) such as numbers and sets. Meanwhile, revolutionary
nominalism is the project of replacing current scientific theories by al-
ternatives dispensing with mathematical objects, see Burgess [30, p. 96]
and Burgess and Rosen [32].
Nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics is often understood
narrowly, as exemplified by the ideas of J. S. Mill and P. Kitcher,
going back to Aristotle.1 However, the Burgessian distinction between
hermeneutic and revolutionary reconstructions can be applied more
broadly, so as to include nominalistic-type reconstructions that vary
widely in their ontological target, namely the variety of abstract objects
(entities) they seek to challenge (and, if possible, eliminate) as being
merely conventional, see [30, p. 98-99].
1See for example S. Shapiro [141].
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Burgess quotes at length Yu. Manin’s critique in the 1970s of math-
ematical nominalism of constructivist inspiration, whose ontological
target is the classical infinity, namely,
abstractions which are infinite and do not lend them-
selves to a constructivist interpretation [112, p. 172-173].
This suggests that Burgess would countenance an application of his
dichotomy to nominalism of a constructivist inspiration.
The ontological target of the constructivists is the concept of Canto-
rian infinities, or more fundamentally, the logical principle of the Law
of Excluded Middle (LEM). Coupled with a classical interpretation of
the existence quantifier, LEM is responsible for propelling the said in-
finities into a dubious existence. LEM is the abstract object targeted
by Bishop’s constructivist nominalism, which can therefore be called
an anti-LEM nominalism.2 Thus, anti-LEM nominalism falls within
the scope of the Burgessian critique, and is the first of the nominalistic
reconstructions we wish to analyze.
The anti-LEM nominalistic reconstruction was in fact a re-recon-
struction of an earlier nominalistic reconstruction of analysis, dating
from the 1870s. The earlier reconstruction was implemented by the
great triumvirate3 of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass. The onto-
logical target of the triumvirate reconstruction was the abstract entity
called the infinitesimal , a basic building block of a continuum,4 accord-
ing to a line of investigators harking back to the Greek antiquity.5
To place these historical developments in context, it is instructive
to examine Felix Klein’s remarks dating from 1908. Having outlined
the developments in real analysis associated with Weierstrass and his
followers, Klein pointed out that
The scientific mathematics of today is built upon the
series of developments which we have been outlining.
But an essentially different conception of infinitesimal
calculus has been running parallel with this [conception]
through the centuries [95, p. 214].
Such a different conception, according to Klein,
2A more detailed discussion of LEM in the context of the proof of the irrationality
of
√
2 may be found in Section 2, see footnote 15.
3C. Boyer refers to Cantor, Dedekind, andWeierstrass as “the great triumvirate”,
see [25, p. 298].
4For an entertaining history of infinitesimals see P. Davis and R. Hersh [46,
p. 237-254]. For an analysis of a variety of competing theories of the continuum,
see P. Ehrlich [51] as well as R. Taylor [157].
5See also footnote 62 on Cauchy.
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harks back to old metaphysical speculations concerning
the structure of the continuum according to which this
was made up of [...] infinitely small parts [95, p. 214]
[emphasis added—authors].
The significance of the triumvirate reconstruction has often been mea-
sured by the yardstick of the extirpation of the infinitesimal.6
The infinitesimal ontological target has similarly been the motivat-
ing force behind a more recent nominalistic reconstruction, namely a
nominalistic re-appraisal of the meaning of Cauchy’s foundational work
in analysis.
We will analyze these three nominalistic projects through the lens
of the dichotomy introduced by Burgess. Our preliminary conclusion
is that, while the triumvirate reconstruction was primarily revolution-
ary in the sense of Burgess, and the (currently prevailing) Cauchy re-
construction is mainly hermeneutic, the anti-LEM reconstruction has
combined elements of both types of nominalism. We will examine the
effects of a nominalist disposition on historiography, teaching, and re-
search.
A traditional view of 19th century analysis holds that a search for
rigor inevitably leads to epsilontics, as developed by Weierstrass in the
1870s; that such inevitable developments culminated in the establish-
ment of ultimate set-theoretic foundations for mathematics by Cantor;
and that eventually, once the antinomies sorted out, such foundations
were explicitly expressed in axiomatic form by Zermelo and Fraenkel.
Such a view entails a commitment to a specific destination or ultimate
goal of scientific devepment as being pre-determined and intrinsically
inevitable. The postulation of a specific outcome, believed to be the
inevitable result of the development of the discipline, is an outlook
specific to the mathematical community. Challenging such a belief ap-
pears to be a radical proposition in the eyes of a typical professional
mathematician, but not in the eyes of scientists in related fields of
6Thus, after describing the formalisation of the real continuum in the 1870s,
on pages 127-128 of his retiring presidential address in 1902, E. Hobson remarks
triumphantly as follows: “It should be observed that the criterion for the con-
vergence of an aggregate [i.e. an equivalence class defining a real number] is of
such a character that no use is made in it of infinitesimals” [80, p. 128] [emphasis
added–authors]. Hobson reiterates: “In all such proofs [of convergence] the only
statements made are as to relations of finite numbers, no such entities as infinites-
imals being recognized or employed. Such is the essence of the ǫ[, δ] proofs with
which we are familiar” [80, p. 128] [emphasis added–authors]. The tenor of Hobson’s
remarks is that Weierstrass’s fundamental accomplishment was the elimination of
infinitesimals from foundational discourse in analysis.
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the exact sciences. It is therefore puzzling that such a view should
be accepted without challenge by a majority of historians of mathe-
matics, who tend to toe the line on the mathematicians’ belief. Could
mathematical analysis have followed a different path of development?
Related material appears in Alexander [2], Giordano [65], Katz and
Tall [92], Kutateladze [99, chapter 63], Mormann [116], Sepkoski [139],
and Wilson [165].
2. An anti-LEM nominalistic reconstruction
This section is concerned with E. Bishop’s approach to reconstruct-
ing analysis. Bishop’s approach is rooted in Brouwer’s revolt against
the non-constructive nature of mathematics as practiced by his con-
temporaries.7
Is there meaning after LEM? The Brouwer–Hilbert debate captured
the popular mathematical imagination in the 1920s. Brouwer’s cry-
ing call was for the elimination of most of the applications of LEM
from meaningful mathematical discourse. Burgess discusses the debate
briefly in his treatment of nominalism in [31, p. 27]. We will analyze
E. Bishop’s implementation of Brouwer’s nominalistic project.8
It is an open secret that the much-touted success of Bishop’s im-
plementation of the intuitionistic project in his 1967 book [16] is due
to philosophical compromises with a Platonist viewpoint that are res-
olutely rejected by the intuitionistic philosopher M. Dummett [49].
Thus, in a dramatic departure from both Kronecker9 and Brouwer,
Bishopian constructivism accepts the completed (actual) infinity of the
integers Z.10
7Similar tendencies on the part of Wittgenstein were analyzed by H. Putnam,
who describes them as “minimalist” [126, p. 242]. See also G. Kreisel [98].
8It has been claimed that Bishopian constructivism, unlike Brouwer’s intuition-
ism, is compatible with classical mathematics, see e.g. Davies [44]. However, Brouw-
erian counterexamples do appear in Bishop’s work; see footnote 17 for more details.
This could not be otherwise, since a verificational interpretation of the quantifiers
necessarily results in a clash with classical mathematics. As a matter of presenta-
tion, the conflict with classical mathematics had been de-emphasized by Bishop.
Bishop finesses the issue of Brouwer’s theorems (e.g., that every function is con-
tinuous) by declaring that he will only deal with uniformly continuous functions
to begin with. In Bishopian mathematics, a circle cannot be decomposed into a
pair of antipodal sets. A counterexample to the classical extreme value theorem is
discussed in [158, p. 295], see footnote 17 for details.
9Kronecker’s position is discussed in more detail in Section 4, in the main text
around footnote 34.
10Intuitionists view N as a potential totality; for a more detailed discussion see,
e.g., [58, section 4.3].
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Bishop expressed himself as follows on the first page of his book:
in another universe, with another biology and another
physics, [there] will develop mathematics which in essence
is the same as ours [16, p. 1].
Since the sensory perceptions of the human body are physics- and
chemistry-bound, a claim of such trans-universe invariance11 amounts
to the positing of a disembodied nature of the infinite natural number
system, transcending physics and chemistry.12
What type of nominalistic reconstruction best fits the bill of Bishop’s
constructivism? Bishop’s rejection of classical mathematics as a “de-
basement of meaning”13 [20, p. 1] would place him squarely in the camp
of revolutionary nominalisms in the sense of Burgess; yet some elements
of Bishop’s program tend to be of the hermeneutic variety, as well.
As an elementary example, consider Bishop’s discussion of the irra-
tionality of the square root of 2 in [20, p. 18]. Irrationality is defined
constructively in terms of being quantifiably apart from each rational
number. The classical proof of the irrationality of
√
2 is a proof by
contradiction. Namely, we assume a hypothesized equality
√
2 = m
n
,
examine the parity of the powers of 2, and arrive at a contradiction. At
11a claim that we attribute to a post-Sputnik fever
12The muddle of realism and anti-realism in the anti-LEM sector will be discussed
in more detail in Section 3. Bishop’s disembodied integers illustrate the awkward
philosophical contorsions which are a tell-tale sign of nominalism. An alternative
approach to the problem is pursued in modern cognitive science. Bishop’s disem-
bodied integers, the cornerstone of his approach, appear to be at odds with modern
cognitive theory of embodied knowledge, see Tall [156], Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez [100],
Sfard [140], Yablo [166]. Reyes [128] presents an intriguing thesis concerning an al-
legedly rhetorical nature of Newton’s attempts at grounding infinitesimals in terms
of moments or nascent and evanescent quantities , and Leibniz’s similar attempts in
terms of “a general heuristic under [the name of] the principle of continuity” [128,
p. 172]. He argues that what made these theories vulnerable to criticism is the
reigning principle in 17th century methodology according to which abstract objects
must necessarily have empirical counterparts/referents. D. Sherry points out that
“Formal axiomatics emerged only in the 19th century, after geometry embraced
objects with no empirical counterparts (e.g., Poncelet’s points at infinity...)” [144,
p. 67]. See also S. Feferman’s approach of conceptual structuralism [58], for a view
of mathematical objects as mental conceptions.
13Bishop diagnosed classical mathematics with a case of a “debasement of mean-
ing” in his Schizophrenia in contemporary mathematics (1973). Hot on the heels of
Schizophrenia came the 1975 Crisis in contemporary mathematics [19], where the
same diagnosis was slapped upon infinitesimal calculus a` la Robinson [131].
A BURGESSIAN CRITIQUE OF NOMINALISTIC TENDENCIES 7
this stage, irrationality is considered to have been proved, in classical
logic.14
However, as Bishop points out, the proof can be modified slightly
so as to avoid LEM, and acquire an enhanced numerical meaning .
Thus, without exploiting the equality
√
2 = m
n
, one can exhibit ef-
fective positive lower bounds for the difference |√2 − m
n
| in terms of
the denominator n, resulting in a constructively adequate proof of ir-
rationality.15 Such a proof is merely a modification of a classical proof,
and can thus be considered a hermeneutic reconstruction thereof. A
number of classical results (though by no means all) can be reinter-
preted constructively, resulting in an enhancement of their numerical
meaning, in some cases at little additional cost. This type of project
is consistent with the idea of a hermeneutic nominalism in the sense of
Burgess, and related to the notion of liberal constructivism in the sense
of G. Hellman (see below).
The intuitionist/constructivist opposition to classical mathematics
is predicated on the the philosophical assumption that “meaningful”
mathematics is mathematics done without the law of excluded middle.
E. Bishop (following Brouwer but surpassing him in rhetoric) is on
record making statements of the sort
“Very possibly classical mathematics will cease to exist
as an independent discipline” [18, p. 54]
(to be replaced, naturally, by constructive mathematics); and
“Brouwer’s criticisms of classical mathematics were con-
cerned with what I shall refer to as ‘the debasement of
meaning’ ” [20, p. 1].
Such a stance posits intuitionism/constructivism as an alternative to
classical mathematics, and is described as radical constructivism by
G. Hellman [74, p. 222]. Radicalism is contrasted by Hellman with a
14The classical proof showing that
√
2 is not rational is, of course, acceptable
in intuitionistic logic. To pass from this to the claim of its irrationality as defined
above, requires LEM (see footnote 15 for details).
15Such a proof may be given as follows. For each rational m/n, the integer 2n2
is divisible by an odd power of 2, while m2 is divisible by an even power of 2.
Hence |2n2−m2| ≥ 1 (here we have applied LEM to an effectively decidable predi-
cate over Z, or more precisely the law of trichotomy). Since the decimal expansion
of
√
2 starts with 1.41 . . ., we may assume m
n
≤ 1.5. It follows that
|
√
2− m
n
| = |2n
2 −m2|
n2
(√
2 + m
n
) ≥ 1
n2
(√
2 + m
n
) ≥ 1
3n2
,
yielding a numerically meaningful proof of irrationality, which is a special case of
Liouville’s theorem on diophantine approximation of algebraic numbers, see [72].
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liberal brand of intuitionism (a companion to classical mathematics).
Liberal constructivism may be exemplified by A. Heyting [77, 78], who
was Brouwer’s student, and formalized intuitionistic logic.
To motivate the long march through the foundations occasioned by
a LEM-eliminative agenda, Bishop [19] goes to great lengths to dress
it up in an appealing package of a theory of meaning that first con-
flates meaning with numerical meaning (a goal many mathematicians
can relate to), and then numerical meaning with LEM extirpation.16
Rather than merely rejecting LEM or related logical principles such as
trichotomy which sound perfectly unexceptionable to a typical mathe-
matician, Bishop presents these principles in quasi metaphysical garb
of “principles of omniscience”.17 Bishop retells a creation story of in-
tuitionism in the form of an imaginary dialog between Brouwer and
Hilbert where the former completely dominates the exchange. Indeed,
Bishop’s imaginary Brouwer-Hilbert exchange is dominated by an un-
spoken assumption that Brouwer is the only one who seeks “meaning”,
an assumption that his illustrious opponent is never given a chance to
challenge. Meanwhile, Hilbert’s comments in 1919 reveal clearly his
attachment to meaning which he refers to as internal necessity :
We are not speaking here of arbitrariness in any sense.
Mathematics is not like a game whose tasks are deter-
mined by arbitrarily stipulated rules. Rather, it is a
conceptual system possessing internal necessity that can
only be so and by no means otherwise [79, p. 14] (cited
in Corry [37]).
16Such a reduction is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
17Thus, the main target of his criticism in [19] is the “limited principle of omni-
science” (LPO). The LPO is formulated in terms of sequences, as the principle that
it is possible to search “a sequence of integers to see whether they all vanish” [19,
p. 511]. The LPO is equivalent to the law of trichotomy: (a < 0)∨(a = 0)∨(a > 0).
An even weaker principle is (a ≤ 0)∨ (a ≥ 0), whose failure is exploited in the con-
struction of a counterexample to the extreme value theorem by Troelstra and van
Dalen [158, p. 295], see also our Section 4. This property is false intuitionistically.
After discussing real numbers x ≥ 0 such that it is “not” true that x > 0 or x = 0,
Bishop writes:
In much the same way we can construct a real number x such that
it is not true that x ≥ 0 or x ≤ 0 [16, p. 26], [17, p. 28].
An a satisfying ¬((a ≤ 0)∨(a ≥ 0)) immediately yields a counterexample f(x) = ax
to the extreme value theorem (EVT) on [0, 1] (see [16, p. 59, exercise 9]; [17,
p. 62, exercise 11]). Bridges interprets Bishop’s italicized “not” as referring to
a Brouwerian counterexample, and asserts that trichotomy as well as the prin-
ciple (a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0) are independent of Bishopian constructivism. See
D. Bridges [28] for details; a useful summary may be found in Taylor [157].
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A majority of mathematicians (including those favorable to construc-
tivism) feel that an implementation of Bishop’s program does involve
a significant complication of the technical development of analysis, as
a result of the nominalist work of LEM-elimination. Bishop’s program
has met with a certain amount of success, and attracted a number
of followers. Part of the attraction stems from a detailed lexicon de-
veloped by Bishop so as to challenge received (classical) views on the
nature of mathematics. A constructive lexicon was a sine qua non of
his success. A number of terms from Bishop’s constructivist lexicon
constitute a novelty as far as intuitionism is concerned, and are not
necessarily familiar even to someone knowledgeable about intuitionism
per se. It may be helpful to provide a summary of such terms for easy
reference, arranged alphabetically, as follows.
• Debasement of meaning is the cardinal sin of the classical opposi-
tion, from Cantor to Keisler,18 committed with LEM (see below). The
term occurs in Bishop’s Schizophrenia [20] and Crisis [19] texts.
• Fundamentalist excluded thirdist is a term that refers to a classically-
trained mathematician who has not yet become sensitized to implicit
use of the law of excluded middle (i.e., excluded third) in his arguments,
see [130, p. 249].19
• Idealistic mathematics is the output of Platonist mathematical
sensibilities, abetted by a metaphysical faith in LEM (see below), and
characterized by the presence of merely a peculiar pragmatic content
(see below).
• Integer is the revealed source of all meaning (see below), posited
as an alternative foundation displacing both formal logic, axiomatic
set theory, and recursive function theory. The integers wondrously
escape20 the vigilant scrutiny of a constructivist intelligence determined
to uproot and nip in the bud each and every Platonist fancy of a concept
external to the mathematical mind.
• Integrity is perhaps one of the most misunderstood terms in Errett
Bishop’s lexicon. Pourciau in his Education [124] appears to interpret
18But see footnote 26.
19This use of the term “fundamentalist excluded thirdist” is in a text by Rich-
man, not Bishop. I have not been able to source its occurrence in Bishop’s writing.
In a similar vein, an ultrafinitist recently described this writer as a “choirboy of
infinitesimology”; however, this term does not seem to be in general use. See also
footnote 29.
20By dint of a familiar oracular quotation from Kronecker; see also main text
around footnote 10.
10 K. KATZ AND M. KATZ
it as an indictment of the ethics of the classical opposition. Yet in his
Schizophrenia text, Bishop merely muses:
[...] I keep coming back to the term “integrity”. [20,
p. 4]
Note that the period is in the original. Bishop describes integrity as
the opposite of a syndrome he colorfully refers to as schizophrenia,
characterized
(a) by a rejection of common sense in favor of formalism,
(b) by debasement of meaning (see above),
(c) as well as by a list of other ills—
but excluding dishonesty. Now the root of
integr-ity
is identical with that of integer (see above), the Bishopian ultimate
foundation of analysis. Bishop’s evocation of integrity may have been
an innocent pun intended to allude to a healthy constructivist mindset,
where the integers are uppermost.21
• Law of excluded middle (LEM) is the main source of the non-
constructivities of classical mathematics.22 Every formalisation of in-
tuitionistic logic excludes LEM ; adding LEM back again returns us to
classical logic.
• Limited principle of omniscience (LPO) is a weak form of LEM
(see above), involving LEM -like oracular abilities limited to the context
of integer sequences.23 The LPO is still unacceptable to a construc-
tivist, but could have served as a basis for a meaningful dialog between
Brouwer and Hilbert (see [19]), that could allegedly have changed the
course of 20th century mathematics.
21In Bishop’s system, the integers are uppermost to the exclusion of the contin-
uum. Bishop rejected Brouwer’s work on an intuitionstic continuum in the following
terms:
Brouwer’s bugaboo has been compulsive speculation about the
nature of the continuum. His fear seems to have been that, unless
he personally intervened to prevent it, the continuum would turn
out to be discrete. [The result was Brouwer’s] semimystical theory
of the continuum [16, p. 6 and 10].
Brouwer sought to incorporate a theory of the continuum as part of intuitionistic
mathematics, by means of his free choice sequences. Bishop’s commitment to integr-
ity is thus a departure from Brouwerian intuitionism.
22See footnote 15 and footnote 17 for some examples.
23See footnote 17 for a discussion of LPO.
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• Meaning is a favorite philosophic term in Bishop’s lexicon, neces-
sarily preceding an investigation of truth in any coherent discussion.
In Bishop’s writing, the term meaning is routinely conflated with nu-
merical meaning (see below).
• Numerical meaning is the content of a theorem admitting a proof
based on intuitionistic logic, and expressing computationally meaning-
ful facts about the integers.24 The conflation of numerical meaning
with meaning par excellence in Bishop’s writing, has the following two
consequences:
(1) it empowers the constructivist to sweep under the rug the dis-
tinction between pre-LEM and post-LEM numerical meaning,
lending a marginal degree of plausibility to a dismissal of clas-
sical theorems which otherwise appear eminently coherent and
meaningful;25 and
(2) it allows the constructivist to enlist the support of anti-realist
philosophical schools of thought (e.g. Michael Dummett) in the
theory of meaning, inspite of the apparent tension with Bishop’s
otherwise realist declarations (see entry realistic mathematics
below).
• Peculiar pragmatic content is an expression of Bishop’s [16, p. viii]
that was analyzed by Billinge [15, p. 179]. It connotes an alleged lack
of empirical validity of classical mathematics, when classical results
are merely inference tickets [15, p. 180] used in the deduction of other
mathematical results.
• Realistic mathematics . The dichotomy of “realist” versus “ideal-
ist” (see above) is the dichotomy of “constructive” versus “classical”
mathematics, in Bishop’s lexicon. There are two main narratives of the
Intuitionist insurrection, one anti-realist and one realist . The issue is
discussed in the next section.
3. Insurrection according to Errett and according to
Michael
The anti-realist narrative, mainly following Michael Dummett [50],
traces the original sin of classical mathematics with LEM , all the way
24As an illustration, a numerically meaningful proof of the irrationality of
√
2
appears in footnote 15.
25See the main text around footnote 34 for a discussion of the classical extreme
value theorem and its LEMless remains.
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back to Aristotle.26 The law of excluded middle (see Section 2) is
the mathematical counterpart of geocentric cosmology (alternatively,
of phlogiston, see [125, p. 299]), slated for the dustbin of history.27 The
anti-realist narrative dismisses the Quine-Putnam indispensability the-
sis (see Feferman [57, Section IIB]) on the grounds that a philosophy-
first examination of first principles is the unique authority empow-
ered to determine the correct way of doing mathematics.28 Generally
speaking, it is this narrative that seems to be favored by a number of
philosophers of mathematics.
Dummett opposes a truth-valued, bivalent semantics, namely the
notion that truth is one thing and knowability another, on the grounds
that it violates Dummett’smanifestation requirement , see Shapiro [142,
p. 54]. The latter requirement, in the context of mathematics, is merely
a restatement of the intuitionistic principle that truth is tantamount
to verifiability (necessitating a constructive interpretation of the quan-
tifiers). Thus, an acceptance of Dummett’s manifestation requirement,
leads to intuitionistic semantics and a rejection of LEM.
In his 1977 foundational text [49] originating from 1973 lecture notes,
Dummett is frank about the source of his interest in the intuition-
ist/classical dispute in mathematics [49, p. ix]:
This dispute bears a strong resemblance to other
disputes over realism of one kind or another, that is,
concerning various kinds of subject-matter (or types of
statement), including that over realism about the phys-
ical universe [emphasis added–authors]
What Dummett proceeds to say at this point, reveals the nature of his
interest:
but intuitionism represents the only sustained attempt
by the opponents of a realist view to work out a coher-
ent embodiment of their philosophical beliefs [emphasis
added–authors]
26the entry under debasement of meaning in Section 2 would read, accordingly,
“the classical opposition from Aristotle to Keisler”; see main text at footnote 18.
27Following Kronecker and Brouwer, Dummett rejects actual infinity, at variance
with Bishop.
28In Hellman’s view, “any [...] attempt to reinstate a ‘first philosophical’ theory
of meaning prior to all science is doomed” [75, p. 439]. What this appears to
mean is that, while there can certainly be a philosophical notion of meaning before
science, any attempt to prescribe standards of meaning prior to the actual practice
of science, is doomed .
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What interests Dummett here is his fight against the realist view . What
endears intuitionists to him, is the fact that they have succeeded where
the phenomenalists have not [49, p. ix]:
Phenomenalists might have attained a greater success if
they had made a remotely comparable effort to show in
detail what consequences their interpretation of material-
object statements would have for our employment of our
language.
However, Dummett’s conflation of the mathematical debate and the
philosophical debate, could be challenged.
We hereby explicitly sidestep the debate opposing the realist (as op-
posed to the super-realist, see W. Tait [153]) position and the anti-
realist position. On the other hand, we observe that a defense of
indispensability of mathematics would necessarily start by challeng-
ing Dummett’s “manifestation”. More precisely, such a defense would
have to start by challenging the extension of Dummett’s manifestation
requirement, from the realm of philosophy to the realm of mathemat-
ics. While Dummett chooses to pin the opposition to intuitionism, to
a belief [49, p. ix] in an
interpretation of mathematical statements as referring
to an independently existing and objective reality[,]
(i.e. a Platonic world of mathematical entities), J. Avigad [6] memo-
rably retorts as follows:
We do not need fairy tales about numbers and triangles
prancing about in the realm of the abstracta.29
Meanwhile, the realist narrative of the intuitionist insurrection ap-
pears to be more consistent with what Bishop himself actually wrote.
In his foundational essay, Bishop expresses his position as follows:
29Constructivist Richman takes a dimmer view of prancing numbers and trian-
gles. In addition, he presents a proposal to eliminate the axiom of choice altogether
from constructive mathematics (including countable choice). Since the ultrafilter
axiom is weaker than the axiom of choice, one might have hoped it would be sal-
vaged; not so:
We are all Platonists, aren’t we? In the trenches, I mean—when the
chips are down. Yes, Virginia, there really are circles, triangles, numbers,
continuous functions, and all the rest. Well, maybe not free ultrafilters.
Is it important to believe in the existence of free ultrafilters? Surely
that’s not required of a Platonist. I can more easily imagine it as a
test of sanity: ‘He believes in free ultrafilters, but he seems harmless’
(Richman [129]).
For Richman’s contribution to constructivist lexicon see footnote 19.
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As pure mathematicians, we must decide whether we
are playing a game, or whether our theorems describe
an external reality [19, p. 507].
The right answer, to Bishop, is that they do describe an external real-
ity.30 The dichotomy of “realist” versus “idealist” is the dichotomy of
“constructive” versus “classical” mathematics, in Bishop’s lexicon (see
entry under idealistic mathematics in Section 2). Bishop’s ambition
is to incorporate “such mathematically oriented disciplines as physics”
[20, p. 4] as part of his constructive revolution, revealing a recogni-
tion, on his part, of the potency of the Quine-Putnam indispensability
challenge.31
N. Kopell and G. Stolzenberg, close associates of Bishop, published
a three-page Commentary [97] following Bishop’s Crisis text. Their
note places the original sin with LEM at around 1870 (rather than
Greek antiquity), when the “flourishing empirico-inductive tradition”
began to be replaced by the “strictly logico-deductive conception of
pure mathematics”. Kopell and Stolzenberg don’t hesitate to com-
pare the empirico-inductive tradition in mathematics prior to 1870, to
physics, in the following terms [97, p. 519]:
[Mathematical] theories were theories about the phe-
nomena, just as in a physical theory.
Similar views have been expressed by D. Bridges [29], as well as Heyt-
ing [77, 78]. W. Tait [152] argues that, unlike intuitionism, constructive
mathematics is part of classical mathematics. In fact, it was Frege’s
revolutionary logic [59] (see Gillies [64]) and other foundational devel-
opments that created a new language and a new paradigm, transform-
ing mathematical foundations into fair game for further investigation,
experimentation, and criticism, including those of constructivist type.
The philosophical dilemmas in the anti-LEM sector discussed in this
section are a function of the nominalist nature of its scientific goals. A
critique of its scientific methods appears in the next section.
4. A critique of the constructivist scientific method
We would like to analyze more specifically the constructivist dilemma
with regard to the following two items:
30Our purpose here is not to endorse or refute Bishop’s views on this point, but
rather to document his actual position, which appears to diverge from Dummett’s.
31Billinge [14, p. 314] purports to detect “inchoate” anti-realist views in Bishop’s
writings, but provides no constructive proof of their existence, other than a pair
quotes on numerical meaning. Meanwhile, Hellman [74, p. 222] writes: “Some of
Bishop’s remarks (1967) suggest that his position belongs in [the radical] category”.
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(1) the extreme value theorem, and
(2) the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorem.
Concerning (1), note that a constructive treatment of the extreme
value theorem (EVT) by Troelstra and van Dalen [158, p. 295] brings to
the fore the instability of the (classically unproblematic) maximum by
actually constructing a counterexample. Such a counterexample relies
on assuming that the principle
(a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0)
fails.32 This is a valuable insight, if viewed as a companion to classical
mathematics.33 If viewed as an alternative, we are forced to ponder
the consequences of the loss of the EVT.
Kronecker is sometimes thought of as the spiritual father of the
Brouwer/Bishop/Dummett tendency. Kronecker was active at a time
when the field of mathematics was still rather compartmentalized.
Thus, he described a 3-way partition thereof into (a) analysis, (b) geom-
etry, and (c) mechanics (presumably meaning mathematical physics).
Kronecker proceeded to state that it is only the analytic one-third of
mathematics that is amenable to a constructivisation in terms of the
natural numbers that “were given to us, etc.”, but readily conceded
that such an approach is inapplicable in the remaining two-thirds, ge-
ometry and physics.34
Nowadays mathematicians adopt a more unitary approach to the
field, and Kronecker’s partition seems provincial, but in fact his cau-
tion was vindicated by later developments, and can even be viewed as
visionary. Consider a field such as general relativity, which in a way is
a synthesis of Kronecker’s remaining two-thirds, namely, geometry and
physics. Versions of the extreme value theorem are routinely exploited
here, in the form of the existence of solutions to variational principles,
such as geodesics, be it spacelike, timelike, or lightlike. At a deeper
level, S.P. Novikov [119, 120] wrote about Hilbert’s meaningful contri-
bution to relativity theory, in the form of discovering a Lagrangian for
Einstein’s equation for spacetime. Hilbert’s deep insight was to show
that general relativity, too, can be written in Lagrangian form, which
is a satisfying conceptual insight.
32This principle is a special case of LEM; see footnote 17.
33Some related ground on pluralism is covered in B. Davies [44]. Mathematical
phenomena such as the instability of the extremum tend to be glossed over when
approached from the classical viewpoint; here a constructive viewpoint can provide
a welcome correction.
34See Boniface and Schappacher [22, p. 211].
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A radical constructivist’s reaction would be to dismiss the material
discussed in the previous paragraph as relying on LEM (needed for the
EVT), hence lacking numerical meaning, and therefore meaningless. In
short, radical constructivism (as opposed to the liberal variety) adopts
a theory of meaning amounting to an ostrich effect35 as far as certain
significant scientific insights are concerned. A quarter century ago,
M. Beeson already acknowledged constructivism’s problem with the
calculus of variations in the following terms:
Calculus of variations is a vast and important field which
lies right on the frontier between constructive and non-
constructive mathematics [10, p. 22].
An even more striking example is the Hawking-Penrose singular-
ity theorem, whose foundational status was explored by Hellman [75].
The theorem relies on fixed point theorems and therefore is also con-
structively unacceptable, at least in its present form. However, the
singularity theorem does provide important scientific insight. Roughly
speaking, one of the versions of the theorem asserts that certain natural
conditions on curvature (that are arguably satisfied experimentally in
the visible universe) force the existence of a singularity when the solu-
tion is continued backward in time, resulting in a kind of a theoretical
justification of the Big Bang. Such an insight cannot be described as
“meaningless” by any reasonable standard of meaning preceding nom-
inalist commitments.
5. The triumvirate nominalistic reconstruction
This section analyzes a nominalistic reconstruction successfully im-
plemented at the end of the 19th century by Cantor, Dedekind, and
Weierstrass. The rigorisation of analysis they accomplished went hand-
in-hand with the elimination of infinitesimals; indeed, the latter accom-
plishment is often viewed as a fundamental one. We would like to state
from the outset that the main issue here is not a nominalistic attitude
on the part of our three protagonists themselves. Such an attitude is
only clearly apparent in the case of Cantor (see below). Rather, we
argue that the historical context in the 1870s favored the acceptance of
their reconstruction by the mathematical community, due to a certain
philosophical disposition.
Some historical background is in order. As argued by D. Sherry [143],
George Berkeley’s 1734 polemical essay [13] conflated a logical criticism
35Such an effect is comparable to a traditional educator’s attitude toward stu-
dents’ nonstandard conceptions studied by Ely [54], see main text in Section 8
around footnote 57.
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and a metaphysical criticism.36 In the intervening centuries, mathe-
maticians have not distinguished between the two criticisms sufficiently,
and grew increasingly suspicious of infinitesimals. The metaphysical
criticism stems from the 17th century doctrine that each theoretical
entity must have an empirical counterpart/referent before such an en-
tity can be used meaningfully; the use of infinitesimals of course would
fly in the face of such a doctrine.37
Today we no longer accept the 17th century doctrine. However, in
addition to the metaphysical criticism, Berkeley made a poignant logi-
cal criticism, pointing out a paradox in the definition of the derivative.
The seeds of an approach to resolving the logical paradox were already
contained in the work of Fermat,38 but it was Robinson who ironed out
the remaining logical wrinkle.
Thus, mathematicians throughout the 19th century were suspicious
of infinitesimals because of a lingering influence of 17th century doc-
trine, but came to reject them because of what they felt were logical
contradictions; these two aspects combined into a nominalistic attitude
that caused the triumvirate reconstruction to spread like wildfire.
The tenor of Hobson’s remarks,39 as indeed of a majority of historians
of mathematics, is that Weierstrass’s fundamental accomplishment was
the elimination of infinitesimals from foundational discourse in analysis.
Infinitesimals were replaced by arguments relying on real inequalities
and multiple-quantifier logical formulas.
The triumvirate transformation had the effect of a steamroller flat-
tening a B-continuum40 into an A-continuum. Even the ardent enthu-
siasts of Weierstrassian epsilontics recognize that its practical effect on
mathematical discourse has been “appalling”; thus, J. Pierpont wrote
as follows in 1899:
36Robinson distinguished between the two criticisms in the following terms: “The
vigorous attack directed by Berkeley against the foundations of the Calculus in
the forms then proposed is, in the first place, a brilliant exposure of their logical
inconsistencies. But in criticizing infinitesimals of all kinds, English or continental,
Berkeley also quotes with approval a passage in which Locke rejects the actual
infinite ... It is in fact not surprising that a philosopher in whose system perception
plays the central role, should have been unwilling to accept infinitary entities” [131,
p. 280-281].
37Namely, infinitesimals cannot be measured or perceived (without suitable op-
tical devices); see footnote 36.
38Fermat’s adequality is analyzed in Section 13. Robinson modified the definition
of the derivative by introducing the standard part function, which we refer to as
the Fermat-Robinson standard part in Sections 13 and 15.
39Hobson’s remarks are analyzed in footnote 6.
40See Section 13.
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The mathematician of to-day, trained in the school of
Weierstrass, is fond of speaking of his science as ‘die
absolut klare Wissenschaft.’ Any attempts to drag in
metaphysical speculations are resented with indignant
energy . With almost painful emotions he looks back
at the sorry mixture of metaphysics and mathematics
which was so common in the last century and at the
beginning of this [122, p. 406] [emphasis added–authors].
Pierpont concludes:
The analysis of to-day is indeed a transparent science.
Built up on the simple notion of number, its truths are
the most solidly established in the whole range of human
knowledge. It is, however, not to be overlooked that
the price paid for this clearness is appalling , it is total
separation from the world of our senses” [122, p. 406]
[emphasis added–authors].
It is instructive to explore what form the “indignant energy” referred
to by Pierpont took in practice, and what kind of rhetoric accompanies
the “painful emotions”. A reader attuned to 19th century literature will
not fail to recognize infinitesimals as the implied target of Pierpont’s
epithet “metaphysical speculations”.
Thus, Cantor published a “proof-sketch” of a claim to the effect that
the notion of an infinitesimal is inconsistent. By this time, several
detailed constructions of non-Archimedean systems had appeared, no-
tably by Stolz and du Bois-Reymond.
When Stolz published a defense of his work, arguing that technically
speaking Cantor’s criticism does not apply to his system, Cantor re-
sponded by artful innuendo aimed at undermining the credibility of his
opponents. At no point did Cantor vouchsafe to address their publi-
cations themselves. In his 1890 letter to Veronese, Cantor specifically
referred to the work of Stolz and du Bois-Reymond. Cantor refers to
their work on non-Archimedean systems as not merely an “abomina-
tion”, but a “self contradictory and completely useless” one.
P. Ehrlich [52, p. 54] analyzes the errors in Cantor’s “proof” and
documents his rhetoric.
The effect on the university classroom has been pervasive. In an
emotionally charged atmosphere, students of calculus today are warned
against taking the apparent ratio dy/dx literally. By the time one
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reaches the chain rule dy
dt
= dy
dx
dx
dt
, the awkward contorsions of an obsti-
nate denial are palpable throughout the spectrum of the undergraduate
textbooks.41
Who invented the real number system? According to van der Waer-
den, Simon Stevin’s
general notion of a real number was accepted, tacitly or
explicitly, by all later scientists [159, p. 69].
D. Fearnley-Sander writes that
the modern concept of real number [...] was essentially
achieved by Simon Stevin, around 1600, and was thor-
oughly assimilated into mathematics in the following
two centuries [56, p. 809].
D. Fowler points out that
Stevin [...] was a thorough-going arithmetizer: he pub-
lished, in 1585, the first popularization of decimal frac-
tions in the West [...]; in 1594, he desribed an algorithm
for finding the decimal expansion of the root of any poly-
nomial, the same algorithm we find later in Cauchy’s
proof of the intermediate value theorem [62, p. 733].
The algorithm is discussed in more detail in [147, §10, p. 475-476].
Unlike Cauchy, who halves the interval at each step, Stevin subdivides
the interval into ten equal parts, resulting in a gain of a new decimal
digit of the solution at every iteration of the algorithm.42
At variance with these historical judgments, the mathematical com-
munity tends overwhelmingly to award the credit for constructing the
real number system to the great triumvirate,43 in appreciation of the
successful extirpation of infinitesimals as a byproduct of the Weier-
strassian epsilontic formulation of analysis.
To illustrate the nature of such a reconstruction, consider Cauchy’s
notion of continuity. H. Freudenthal notes that “Cauchy invented our
notion of continuity” [60, p. 136]. Cauchy’s starting point is a de-
scription of perceptual continuity of a function in terms of “varying by
41A concrete suggestion with regard to undergraduate teaching may be found at
the end of Section 8.
42Stevin’s numbers were anticipated by E. Bonfils in 1350, see S. Gandz [63].
Bonfils says that “the unit is divided into ten parts which are called Primes, and
each Prime is divided into ten parts which are called Seconds, and so on into
infinity” [63, p. 39].
43See footnote 3 for the origin of this expression.
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imperceptible degrees”. Such a turn of phrase occurs both in his letter
to Coriolis of 1837, and in his 1853 text [36, p. 35].44
Cauchy transforms perceptual continuity into a mathematical notion
by exploiting his conception of an infinitesimal as being generated by
a null sequence (see [26]). Both in 1821 and in 1853, Cauchy defines
continuity of y = f(x) in terms of an infinitesimal x-increment resulting
in an infinitesimal change in y.
The well-known nominalistic residue of the perceptual definition (a
residue that dominates our classrooms) would have f be continuous
at x if for every positive epsilon there exists a positive delta such that
if h is less than delta then f(x+h)− f(x) is less than epsilon, namely:
∀ǫ > 0∃δ > 0 : |h| < δ =⇒ |f(x+ h)− f(x)| < ǫ.
This can hardly be said to be a hermeneutic reconstruction of Cauchy’s
infinitesimal definition. In our classrooms, are students being dressed
to perform multiple-quantifier Weierstrassian epsilontic logical stunts,
on the pretense of being taught infinitesimal calculus?45
Lord Kelvin’s technician,46 wishing to exploit the notion of conti-
nuity in a research paper, is unlikely to be interested in 4-quantifier
definitions thereof. Regardless of the answer to such a question, the
revolutionary nature of the triumvirate reconstruction of the founda-
tions of analysis is evident. If one accepts the thesis that elimination
of ontological entities called “infinitesimals” does constitute a species
of nominalism, then the triumvirate recasting of analysis was a nomi-
nalist project. We will deal with Cantor and Dedekind in more detail
in Section 6.
6. Cantor and Dedekind
Cantor is on record describing infinitesimals as the “cholera bacil-
lus of mathematics” in a letter dated 12 december 1893, quoted in
Meschkowski [113, p. 505] (see also Dauben [42, p. 353] and [43, p. 124]).
Cantor went as far as publishing a purported “proof” of their logical
44Both Cauchy’s original French “par degre´s insensibles”, and its correct Eng-
lish translation “by imperceptible degrees”, are etymologically related to sensory
perception.
45One can apply here Burgess’s remark to the effect that “[t]his is educational
reform in the wrong direction: away from applications, toward entanglement in
logical subtleties” [30, pp. 98-99].
46In analyzing Chihara’s and Field’s nominalist reconstructions, Burgess [30,
p. 96] is sceptical as to the plausibility of interpreting what Lord Kelvin’s technician
is saying, in terms of tacit knowledge of such topics in foundations of mathematics
as predicative analysis and measurement theory.
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inconsistency, as discussed in Section 5. Cantor may have extended
numbers both in terms of the complete ordered field of real numbers
and his theory of infinite cardinals; however, he also passionately be-
lieved that he had not only given a logical foundation to real analysis,
but also simultaneously eliminated infinitesimals (the cholera bacillus).
Dedekind, while admitting that there is no evidence that the “true”
continuum indeed possesses the property of completeness he champi-
oned (see M. Moore [115, p. 82]), at the same time formulated his
definition of what came to be known as Dedekind cuts, in such a way
as to rule out infinitesimals.
S. Feferman describes Dedekind’s construction of an complete or-
dered line (R, <) as follows:
Dedekind’s construction of such an (R, <) is obtained by
taking it to consist of the rational numbers together with
the numbers corresponding to all those cuts (X1, X2)
in Q for which X1 has no largest element and X2 has
no least element, ordered in correspondence to the or-
dering of cuts (X1, X2) < (Y1, Y2) when X1 is a proper
subset of Y1. Dedekind himself spoke of this construc-
tion of R a[s] individual cuts in Q for which X1 has no
largest element and X2 no least element as the creation
of an irrational number ,47 though he did not identify
the numbers themselves with those cuts [58].
In this way the “gappiness” of the rationals is overcome, in Dedekind’s
terminology.
Now requiring that an element of the continuum should induce a
partition of Q does not yet rule out infinitesimals. However, requiring
that a given partition of Q should correspond to a unique element of
the continuum, does have the effect of ruling out infinitesimals. In the
context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum, it is clear that a pair
of quantities in the cluster (halo) infinitely close to π, for example, will
define the same partition of the rationals. Therefore the clause of “only
one” forces a collapse of the infinitesimal cluster to a single quantity,
in this case π.
Was rigor linked to the elimination of infinitesimals? E. Hobson in
his retiring presidential address [80, p. 128] in 1902 summarized the
advances in analysis over the previous century, and went on explicitly
to make a connection between the foundational accomplishments in
analysis, on the one hand, and the elimination of infinitesimals, on the
other, by pointing out that an equivalence class defining a real number
47Dedekind [47] in 1872, translation in Ewald [55, p. 773].
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“is of such a character that no use is made in it of infinitesimals,”48
suggesting that Hobson viewed them as logically inconsistent (perhaps
following Cantor or Berkeley). The matter of rigor will be analyzed in
more detail in the next section.
7. A critique of the Weierstrassian scientific method
In criticizing the nominalistic aspect of the Weierstrassian elimina-
tion of infinitesimals, does one neglect the mathematical reasons why
this was considered desirable?
The stated goal of the triumvirate program was mathematical rigor.
Let us examine the meaning of mathematical rigor. Conceivably rigor
could be interpreted in at least the following four ways, not all of which
we endorse:
(1) it is a shibboleth that identifies the speaker as belonging to a
clan of professional mathematicians;
(2) it represents the idea that as the field develops, its practitioners
attain greater and more conceptual understanding of key issues,
and are less prone to error;
(3) it represents the idea that a search for greater correctness in
analysis inevitably led Weierstrass to epsilontics in the 1870s;
(4) it refers to the establishment of ultimate foundations for math-
ematics by Cantor, eventually explicitly expressed in axiomatic
form by Zermelo and Fraenkel.49
Item (1) may be pursued by a fashionable academic in the social sci-
ences, but does not get to the bottom of the issue. Meanwhile, item (2)
could apply to any exact science, and does not involve a commitment
as to which route the development of mathematics may have taken.
Item (2) could be supported by scientists in and outside of mathemat-
ics alike, as it does not entail a commitment to a specific destination
or ultimate goal of scientific devepment as being pre-determined and
intrinsically inevitable.
48See footnote 6 for more details on Hobson.
49It would be interesting to investigate the role of the Zermelo–Frankel axioma-
tisation of set theory in cementing the nominalistic disposition we are analyzing.
Keisler points out that “the second- and higher-order theories of the real line de-
pend on the underlying universe of set theory [...] Thus the properties of the real
line are not uniquely determined by the axioms of set theory” [94, p. 228] [emphasis
in the original–the authors]. He adds: “A set theory which was not strong enough
to prove the unique existence of the real line would not have gained acceptance as
a mathematical foundation” [94, p. 228]. Edward Nelson [118] has developed an
alternative axiomatisation more congenial to infinitesimals.
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On the other hand, the actual position of a majority of professional
mathematicians today corresponds to items (3) and (4). The crucial
element present in (3) and (4) and absent in (2) is the postulation of a
specific outcome, believed to be the inevitable result of the development
of the discipline. Challenging such a belief appears to be a radical
proposition in the eyes of a typical professional mathematician, but
not in the eyes of scientists in related fields of the exact sciences. It
is therefore particularly puzzling that (3) and (4) should be accepted
without challenge by a majority of historians of mathematics, who tend
to toe the line on the mathematicians’ belief . It is therefore necessary
to examine such a belief, which, as we argue, stems from a particular
philosophical disposition akin to nominalism.
Could mathematical analysis have followed a different path of devel-
opment? In an intriguing text published a decade ago, Pourciau [125]
examines the foundational crisis of the 1920s and the Brouwer–Hilbert
controversy, and argues that Brouwer’s view may have prevailed had
Brouwer been more of an. . . Errett Bishop.50 While we are sceptical as
to Pourciau’s main conclusions, the unmistakable facts are as follows:
(1) a real struggle did take place;
(2) some of the most brilliant minds at the time did side with
Brouwer, at least for a period of time (e.g., Hermann Weyl);
(3) the battle was won by Hilbert not by mathematical means alone
but also political ones, such as maneuvering Brouwer out of a
key editorial board;
(4) while retroactively one can offer numerous reasons why Hilbert’s
victory might have been inevitable, this was not at all obvious
at the time.
We now leap back a century, and consider a key transitional figure,
namely Cauchy. In 1821, Cauchy defined continuity of y = f(x) in
terms of “an infinitesimal x-increment corresponding to an infinitesi-
mal y-increment”.51 Many a practicing mathematician, brought up on
an alleged “Cauchy-Weierstrass ǫ, δ” tale, will be startled by such a
revelation. The textbooks and the history books routinely obfuscate
the nature of Cauchy’s definition of continuity.
Fifty years before Weierstrass, Cauchy performed a hypostatisation
by encapsulating a variable quantity tending to zero, into an individ-
ual/atomic entity called “an infinitesimal”.
50More specifically, Pourciau would have wanted Brouwer to stop “wasting time”
on free choice sequences and the continuum, and to focus instead on developing
analysis on a constructive footing based on N.
51See Section 9 for more details on Cauchy’s definition.
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Was the naive traditional “definition” of the infinitesimal blatantly
self-contradictory? We argue that it was not. Cauchy’s definition in
terms of null sequences is a reasonable definition, and one that con-
nects well with the sequential approach of the ultrapower construc-
tion.52 Mathematicians viewed infinitesimals with deep suspicion due
in part to a conflation of two separate criticisms, the logical one and
the metaphysical one, by Berkeley, see Sherry [143]. Thus, the empha-
sis on the elimination of infinitesimals in the traditional account of the
history of analysis is misplaced.
Could analysis could have developed on the basis of infinitesimals?53
Continuity, as all fundamental notions of analysis, can be defined, and
were defined, by Cauchy in terms of infinitesimals. Epsilontics could
have played a secondary role of clarifying whatever technical situations
were too awkward to handle otherwise, but arguably they needn’t have
replaced infinitesimals. As far as the issue of rigor is concerned, it needs
to be recognized that Gauss and Dirichlet published virtually error-free
mathematics before Weierstrassian epsilontics, while Weierstrass him-
self was not protected by epsilontics from publishing an erroneous paper
by S. Kovalevskaya (the error was found by Volterra, see [127, p. 568]).
As a scientific discipline develops, its practitioners gain a better under-
standing of the conceptual issues, which helps them avoid errors. But
assigning a singular, oracular, and benevolent role in this to epsilontics
is philosophically naive. The proclivity to place the blame for errors on
infinitesimals betrays a nominalistic disposition aimed agaist the ghosts
of departed quantities , already dubbed “charlatanerie” by d’Alembert
[40] in 1754.
8. A question session
The following seven questions were formulated by R. Hersh, who also
motivated the author to present the material of Section 4, as well as
that of Section 7.
Question 8.1. Was a nominalistic viewpoint motivating the triumvi-
rate project?
Answer. We argue that the answer is affirmative, and cite two items
as evidence:
(1) Dedekind’s cuts and the “essence of continuity”, and
(2) Cantor’s tooth-and-nail fight against infinitesimals.
52See discussion around formula (15.3) in Section 15 for more details.
53The issue of alternative axiomatisations is discussed in footnote 49.
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Concerning (1), mathematicians widely believed that Dedekind dis-
covered such an essence. What is meant by the essence of continuity in
this context is the idea that a pair of “cuts” on the rationals are iden-
tical if and only if the pair of numbers defining them are equal. Now
the “if” part is unobjectionable, but the almost reflexive “only if” part
following it has the effect of a steamroller flattening the B-continuum54
into an A-continuum. Namely, it collapses each monad (halo, cluster)
to a point, since a pair of infinitely close (adequal) points necessarily
define the same cut on the rationals (see Section 6 for more details).
The fact that the steamroller effect was gladly accepted as a near-axiom
is a reflection of a nominalistic attitude.
Concerning (2), Cantor not only published a “proof-sketch” of the
non-existence of infinitesimals, he is on record calling them an “abom-
ination” as well as the “cholera bacillus” of mathematics. When Stolz
meekly objected that Cantor’s “proof” does not apply to his system,
Cantor responded by the “abomination” remark (see Section 6 for more
details). Now Cantor’s proof contains an error that was exhastively an-
alyzed by Ehrlich [52]. As it stands, it would “prove” the non-existence
of the surreals! Incidentally, Ehrlich recently proved that “maximal”
surreals are isomorphic to “maximal” hyperreals. Can Cantor’s atti-
tude be considered as a philosophical predisposition to the detriment
of infinitesimals?
Question 8.2. It has been written that Cauchy’s concern with clari-
fying the foundations of calculus was motivated by the need to teach
it to French military cadets.
Answer. Cauchy did have some tensions with the management of
the Ecole Polytechnique over the teaching of infinitesimals between
1814 and 1820. In around 1820 he started using them in earnest in
both his textbooks and his research papers, and continued using them
throughout his life, well past his teaching stint at the Ecole. Thus, in
his 1853 text [36] he reaffirms the infinitesimal definition of continuity
he gave in his 1821 textbook [33].
Question 8.3. Doesn’t reasoning by infinitesimals require a deep in-
tuition that is beyond the reach of most students?
Kathleen Sullivan’s study [151] from 1976 shows that students en-
rolled in sections based on Keisler’s textbook end up having a better
conceptual grasp of the notions of calculus than control groups fol-
lowing the standard approach. Two years ago, I taught infinitesimal
54See Section 13.
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calculus to a group of 25 freshmen. I also had to train the TA who was
new to the material. According to persistent reports from the TA, the
students have never been so excited about learning calculus. On the
contrary, it is the multiple-quantifier Weierstrassian epsilontic logical
stunts that our students are dressed to perform (on pretense of being
taught infinitesimal calculus) that are beyond their reach. In an ironic
commentary on the nominalistic ethos reigning in our departments, not
only was I relieved of my teaching this course the following year, but
the course number itself was eliminated.
Question 8.4. It may true that “epsilontics” is in practice repugnant
to many students. But the question is whether an issue that is re-
ally a matter of technical mathematics related to pedagogy is being
misleadingly presented as a question of high metaphysics.
Answer. Berkeley turned this into a metaphysical debate. Genera-
tions of mathematicians have grown up thinking of it as a metaphysical
debate. Such a characterisation is precisely what we contest.
Question 8.5. Isn’t “a positive number smaller than all positive num-
bers” self-contradictory? Is a phrase such as “I am smaller than my-
self”, intelligible?
Answer. Both Carnot and Cauchy say that an infinitesimal is gen-
erated by a variable quantity that becomes smaller than any fixed
quantity. No contradiction here. The otherwise excellent study by
Ehrlich [52] contains a curious slip with regard to Poisson. Poisson
describes infinitesimals as being “less than any given magnitude of the
same nature” [123, p. 13-14] (the quote is reproduced in Boyer [25,
p. 283]). Ehrlich inexplicably omits the crucial modifier “given” when
quoting Poisson in footnote 133 on page 76 of [52]. Based on the in-
complete quote, Ehrlich proceeds to agree with Veronese’s assessment
(of Poisson) that “[t]his proposition evidently contains a contradiction
in terms” [160, p. 622]. Our assessment is that Poisson’s definition is
in fact perfectly consistent.
Question 8.6. Infinitesimals were one thorny issue. Didn’t it take the
modern theory of formal languages to untangle that?
Answer. Not exactly. A long tradition of technical work in non-
Archimedean continua starts with Stolz and du Bois-Reymond, Levi-
Civita, Hilbert, and Borel, see Ehrlich [52]. The tradition continues
uninterruptedly until Hewitt constructs the hyperreals in 1948. Then
came  Los´’s theorem whose consequence is a transfer principle, which
is a mathematical implementation of the heuristic “law of continuity”
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of Leibniz (“what’s true in the finite domain should remain true in the
infinite domain”). What  Los´ and Robinson untangled was the transfer
principle. Non-Archimedean systems had a long history prior to these
developments.
Question 8.7. There is still a pedagogical issue. I do understand that
Keisler’s calculus book is teachable. But this says nothing about the
difficulty of teaching calculus in terms of infinitesimals back around
1800. Keisler has Robinson’s non-standard analysis available, as a way
to make sense of infinitesimals. Cauchy did not. Do you believe that
Cauchy used a definition of infinitesimal in terms of a null sequence of
rationals (or reals) in teaching introductory calculus?
Answer. The historical issue about Cauchy is an interesting one.
Most of his course notes from the period 1814-1820 have been lost. His
predecessor at the Ecole Polytechnique, L. Carnot, defined infinitesi-
mals exactly the same way as Cauchy did, but somehow is typically
viewed by historians as belonging to the old school as far as infinitesi-
mals are concerned (and criticized for his own version of the “cancella-
tion of errors” argument originating with Berkeley). As far as Cauchy’s
textbooks from 1821 onward indicate, he declares at the outset that
infinitesimals are an indispensable foundational tool, defines them in
terms of null sequences (more specifically, “a variable quantity becomes
an infinitesimal”), defines continuity in terms of infinitesimals, defines
his “Dirac” delta function in terms of infinitesimals (see [103]), defines
infinitesimals of arbitrary real order in [35, p. 281], anticipating later
work by Stolz, du Bois-Reymond, and others.
The following eight questions were posed by Martin Davis.
Question 8.8. How would you answer the query: how do you define
a “null sequence”? Aren’t you back to epsilons?
Answer. Not necessarily. One could define it, for example, in terms
of “only finitely many terms outside each given separation from zero”.
While epsilontics has important applications, codifying the notion of a
null sequence is not one of them. Epsilontics is helpful when it comes
to characterizing a Cauchy sequence, if one does not yet know the lim-
iting value. If one does know the limiting value, as in the case of a null
sequence, a multiple-quantifier epsilontic formulation is no clearer than
saying that all the terms eventually get arbitrarily small. To be more
specific, if one describes a Cauchy sequence by saying that “terms even-
tually get arbitrarily close to each other”, the ambiguity can lead and
has led to errors, though not in Cauchy (the sequences are rightfully
named after him as he was aware of the trap). Such an ambiguity is
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just not there as far as null sequences are concerned. Giving an epsilon-
tic definition of a null sequence does not increase understanding and
does not decrease the likelihood of error. A null sequence is arguably
a notion that’s no more complex than multiple-quantifier epsilontics,
just as the natural numbers are no more complex than the set-theoretic
definition thereof in terms of 0 = ∅, 1 = {∅}, 2 = {∅, {∅}}, . . . which
requires infinitely many set-theoretic types to make the point. Isn’t a
natural number a more primitive notion?
Question 8.9. You evoke Cauchy’s use of variable quantities. But
whatever is a “variable quantity”?
The concept of variable quantity was not clearly defined by mathe-
maticians from Leibniz and l’Hopital onwards, and is today considered
a historical curiosity. Cauchy himself sometimes seems to think they
take discrete values (in his 1821 text [33]) and sometimes continuous
(in his 1823 text [34]). Many historians agree that in 1821 they were
discrete sequences, and Cauchy himself gives explicit examples of se-
quences. Now it is instructive to compare such variable quantities to the
procedures advocated by the triumvirate. In fact, the approach can be
compared to Cantor’s construction of the real numbers. A real number
is a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers, modulo an equivalence rela-
tion. A sequence, which is not an individual/atomic entity, comes to be
viewed as an atomic entity by a process which in triumvirate lexicon is
called an equivalence relation, but in much older philosophical termi-
nology is called hypostatisation. In education circles, researchers tend
to use terms such as encapsulation, procept , and reification, instead.
As you know, the ultrapower construction is a way of hypostatizing a
hyperreal out of sequences of reals. As far as Cauchy’s competing views
of a variable quantity as discrete (in 1821) or continuous (in 1823), they
lead to distinct implementations of a B-continuum in Hewitt (1948),
when a “continuous” version of the ultrapower construction was used,
and in Luxemburg (1962), where the discrete version was used (a more
recent account of the latter is in Goldblatt [68]).
Question 8.10. Isn’t the notion of a variable quantity a pernicious
notion that makes time an essential part of mathematics?
Answer. I think you take Zeno’s paradoxes too seriously. I personally
don’t think there is anything wrong with involving time in mathemat-
ics. It has not led to any errors as far as I know, pace Zeno.
Question 8.11. Given what relativity has taught us about time, is it
a good idea to involve time in mathematics?
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Answer. What did relativity teach us about time that would make
us take time out of mathematics? That time is relative? But you
may be confusing metaphysics with mathematics. Time that’s being
used in mathematics is not an exact replica of physical time. We may
still be influenced by 17th century doctrine according to which every
theoretical entity must have an empirical counterpart/referent. This is
why Berkeley was objecting to infinitesimals (his metaphysical criticism
anyway). I would put time back in mathematics the same way I would
put infinitesimals back in mathematics. Neither concept is under any
obligation of corresponding to an empirical referent.
Question 8.12. Didn’t the triumvirate show us how to prove the ex-
istence of a complete ordered field?
Answer. Simon Stevin had already made major strides in defining
the real numbers, represented by decimals. Some essential work needed
to be done, such as the fact that the usual operations are well defined.
This was done by Dedekind, see Fowler [62]. But Stevin numbers
themselves were several centuries older, even though they go under
the soothing name of numbers so real .55
Question 8.13. My NSA book [45] does it by forming the quotient of
the ring of finite hyper-rational numbers by the ideal of infinitesimals. . .
The remarkable fact is that this construction is already anticipated
by Ka¨stner (a contemporary of Euler’s) in the following terms: “If one
partitions 1 without end into smaller and smaller parts, and takes larger
and larger collections of such little parts, one gets closer and closer to
the irrational number without ever attaining it”. Ka¨stner concludes:
“Therefore one can view it as an infinite collection of
infinitely small parts” [83], cited by Cousquer [38].56
Question 8.14. . . . but that construction was not available to the
earlier generations.
But Stevin numbers were. They kept on teaching analysis in France
throughout the 1870s without any need for “constructing” something
that had already been around for a century before Leibniz, see discus-
sion in Laugwitz [104, p. 274].
Question 8.15. Aren’t you conflating the problem of rigorous foun-
dation with how to teach calculus to beginners?
55This theme is developed in more detail in Section 5.
56Ka¨stner’s suggestion is implemented by the surjective leftmost vertical arrow
in our Figure 5 in Section 15.
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Figure 1. Differentiating y = f(x) = x2 at x = 1 yields
∆y
∆x
= f(.9..)−f(1)
.9..−1
= (.9..)
2
−1
.9..−1
= (.9..−1)(.9..+1)
.9..−1
= .9.. + 1 ≈ 2.
Here ≈ is the relation of being infinitely close (adequal).
Hyperreals of the form .9.. are discussed in [85]
As far as rigorous foundations are concerned, alternative foundations
to ZF have been developed that are more congenial to infinitesimals,
such as Edward Nelson’s [118]. Mathematicians are accustomed to
thinking of ZF as “the foundations”. It needs to be recognized that
this is a philosophical assumption. The assumption can be a reflection
of a nominalist mindframe.
The example of a useful application of infinitesimals analyzed at the
end of this section is quite elementary. A more advanced example is the
elegant construction of the Haar measure in terms of counting infinites-
imal neighborhoods, see Goldblatt [68]. Even more advanced examples
such as the proof of the invariant subspace conjecture are explained
in your book [45]. For an application to the Bolzmann equation, see
Arkeryd [4, 5].
As a concrete example of what consequences a correction of the nomi-
nalistic triumvirate attitude would entail in the teaching of the calculus,
consider the problem of the unital evaluation of the decimal .999 . . .,
i.e., its evaluation to the unit value 1. Students are known overwhelm-
ingly to believe that the number a = .999 . . . falls short of 1 by an
infinitesimal amount. A typical instructor believes such student in-
tuitions to be erroneous, and seeks to inculcate the unital evaluation
of a. An alternative approach was proposed by Ely [54] and Katz &
Katz [84]. Instead of refuting student intuitions, an instructor could
build upon them to calculate the derivative of y = x2 at x = 1 by
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choosing an infinitesimal ∆x = a− 1 and showing that
∆y
∆x
=
a2 − 12
a− 1 =
(a− 1)(a+ 1)
a− 1 = a+ 1
is infinitely close (adequal) to 2, yielding the desired value without ei-
ther epsilontics, estimates, or limits, see Figure 1. Here a is interpreted
as an extended decimal string with an infinite hypernatural’s worth
of 9s, see [105]. Instead of building upon student intuition, a typical
calculus course seeks to flatten it into the ground by steamrolling the
B-continuum into the A-continuum, see Katz and Katz [84, 85]. A
nominalist view of what constitutes an allowable number system has
produced an ostrich effect57 whereby mathematics educators around the
globe have failed to recognize the legitimacy, and potency, of students’
nonstandard conceptions of .999 . . ., see Ely [54] for details.
9. The battle for Cauchy’s lineage
This section analyzes the reconstruction of Cauchy’s foundational
work in analysis usually associated with J. Grabiner, and has its sources
in the work of C. Boyer. A critical analysis of the traditional approach
may be found in Hourya Benis Sinaceur’s article [145] from 1973. To
place such work in a historical perspective, a minimal chronology of
commentators on Cauchy’s foundational work in analysis would have
to mention F. Klein’s observation in 1908 that
since Cauchy’s time, the words infinitely small are used
in modern textbooks in a somewhat changed sense. One
never says, namely, that a quantity is infinitely small,
but rather that it becomes infinitely small” [95, p. 219].
Indeed, Cauchy’s starting point in defining an infinitesimal is a null
sequence (i.e., sequence tending to zero), and he repeatedly refers to
such a null sequence as becoming an infinitesimal.
P. Jourdain’s detailed 1913 study [82] of Cauchy is characterized by
a total absence of any claim to the effect that Cauchy may have based
his notion of infinitesimal, on limits.
C. Boyer quotes Cauchy’s definition of continuity as follows:
the function f is continuous within given limits if be-
tween these limits an infinitely small increment i in
the variable x produces always an infinitely small incre-
ment, f(x+ i)− f(x), in the function itself [25, p. 277].
57Such an effect is comparable to a constructivist’s reaction to the challenge of
meaningful applications of a post-LEM variety, see main text in Section 4 around
footnote 35.
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Next, Boyer proceeds to interpret Cauchy’s definition of continuity as
follows: “The expressions infinitely small are here to be understood [...]
in terms of [...] limits: i.e., f(x) is continuous within an interval if
the limit of the variable f(x) as x approaches a is f(a), for any value
of a within this interval” [emphasis added–authors]. Boyer feels that
infinitesimals are to be understood in terms of limits. Or perhaps they
are to be understood otherwise?
In 1967, A. Robinson discussed the place of infinitesimals in Cauchy’s
work. He pointed out that “the assumption that [infinitesimals] satisfy
the same laws as the ordinary numbers, which was stated explicitly by
Leibniz, was rejected by Cauchy as unwarranted”. Yet,
Cauchy’s professed opinions in these matters notwith-
standing, he did in fact treat infinitesimals habitually
as if they were ordinary numbers and satisfied the fa-
miliar rules of arithmetic58 [132, p. 36], [133, p. 545].
T. Koetsier remarked that, had Cauchy wished to extend the domain
of his functions to include infinitesimals, he would no doubt have men-
tioned how exactly the functions are to be so extended.59 Beyond the
observation that Cauchy did, in fact, make it clear that such an exten-
sion is to be carried out term-by-term,60 Koetsier’s question prompts
a similar query: had Cauchy wished to base his calculus on limits,
he would no doubt have mentioned something about such a founda-
tional stance. Instead, Cauchy emphasized that in founding analysis
he was unable to avoid elaborating the fundamental properties of in-
finitely small quantities , see [33]. No mention of a foundational role of
limits is anywhere to be found in Cauchy, unlike his would-be modern
interpreters.
58Freudenthal, similarly, notes a general tendency on Cauchy’s part not to play
by the rules: “Cauchy was rather more flexible than dogmatic, for more often than
not he sinned against his own precepts” [60, p. 137]. Cauchy’s irrevent attitude
extended into the civic domain, as Freudenthal reports the anecdote dealing with
Cauchy’s stint as social worker in the town of Sceaux: “he spent his entire salary
for the poor of that town, about which behavior he reassured the mayor: ‘Do not
worry, it is only my salary; it is not my money, it is the emperor’s’ ” [60, p. 133].
59Here Koetsier asks: “If Cauchy had really wanted to consider functions defined
on sets of infinitesimals, isn’t it then highly improbable that he would not have
explicitly said so?” [96, p. 90].
60Namely, an infinitesimal being generated by a null sequence, we evaluate f at
it by applying f to each term in the sequence. Br˚ating [26] analyzes Cauchy’s use
of the particular sequence x = 1
n
in [36].
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L. Sad et al have pursued this matter in detail in [136], arguing that
what Cauchy had in mind was a prototype of an ultrapower construc-
tion, where the equivalence class of a null sequence indeed produces an
infinitesimal, in a suitable set-theoretic framework.61
To summarize, a post-Jourdain nominalist reconstruction of Cauchy’s
infinitesimals, originating no later than Boyer, reduces them to a Weier-
strassian notion of limit. To use Burgess’ terminology borrowed from
linguistics, the Boyer-Grabiner interpretation
becomes the hypothesis that certain noun phrases [in
the present case, infinitesimals] in the surface structure
are without counterpart in the deep structure [30, p. 97].
Meanwhile, a rival school of thought places Cauchy’s continuum firmly
in the line of infinitesimal-enriched continua. The ongoing debate be-
tween rival visions of Cauchy’s continuum echoes Felix Klein’s senti-
ment reproduced above.62
Viewed through the lens of the dichotomy introduced by Burgess, it
appears that the traditional Boyer-Grabiner view is best described as
a hermeneutic, rather than revolutionary, nominalistic reconstruction
of Cauchy’s foundational work.
Cauchy’s definition of continuity in terms of infinitesimals has been
a source of an on-going controversy, which provides insight into the
nominalist nature of the Boyer-Grabiner reconstruction. Many histo-
rians have interpreted Cauchy’s definition as a proto-Weierstrassian
definition of continuity in terms of limits. Thus, Smithies [146, p. 53,
footnote 20] cites the page in Cauchy’s book where Cauchy gave the
infinitesimal definition, but goes on to claim that the concept of limit
was Cauchy’s “essential basis” for his concept of continuity [146, p. 58].
Smithies looked in Cauchy, saw the infinitesimal definition, and went
on to write in his paper that he saw a limit definition. Such auto-
mated translation has been prevalent at least since Boyer [25, p. 277].
Smithies cites chapter and verse in Cauchy where the latter gives an in-
finitesimal definition of continuity, and proceeds to claim that Cauchy
gave a modern one. Such awkward contortions are a trademark of a
nominalist. In the next section, we will examine the methodology of
nominalistic Cauchy scholarship.
61See formula (15.3) in Section 15.
62See discussion of Klein in the main text around footnote 5. The two rival
views of Cauchy’s infinitesimals have been pursued by historians, mathematicians,
and philosophers, alike. The bibliography in the subject is vast. The most de-
tailed statement of Boyer’s position may be found in Grabiner [69]. Robinson’s
perspective was developed most successfully by D. Laugwitz [102] in 1989, and by
K. Br˚ating [26] in 2007.
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10. A subtle and difficult idea of adequality
The view of the history of analysis from the 1670s to the 1870s
as a 2-century triumphant march toward the yawning heights of the
rigor63 of Weierstrassian epsilontics has permeated the very language
mathematicians speak today, making an alternative account nearly un-
thinkable. A majority of historians have followed suit, though some
truly original thinkers differed. These include C. S. Peirce, Felix Klein,
N. N. Luzin [107], Hans Freudenthal, Robinson, Lakatos [108], Laug-
witz, Teixeira [136], and Br˚ating [26].
Meanwhile, J. Grabiner offered the following reflection on the subject
of George Berkeley’s criticism of infinitesimal calculus:
[s]ince an adequate response to Berkeley’s objections
would have involved recognizing that an equation in-
volving limits is a shorthand expression for a sequence of
inequalities—a subtle and difficult idea—no eighteenth
century analyst gave a fully adequate answer to Berkeley
[70, p. 189].
This is an astonishing claim, which amounts to reading back into his-
tory, feedback-style, developments that came much later.64 Such a
claim amounts to postulating the inevitability of a triumphant march,
from Berkeley onward, toward the radiant future of Weierstrassian ep-
silontics (“sequence of inequalities—a subtle and difficult idea”). The
claim of such inevitability in our opinion is an assumption that requires
further argument. Berkeley was, after all, attacking the coherence of
infinitesimals . He was not attacking the coherence of some kind of
incipient form of Weierstrassian epsilontics and its inequalities. Isn’t
there a simpler answer to Berkeley’s query, in terms of a distinction
between “variable quantity” and “given quantity” already present in
l’Hoˆpital’s textbook at the end of the 17th century? The missing ingre-
dient was a way of relating a variable quantity to a given quantity, but
that, too, was anticipated by Pierre de Fermat’s concept of adequality,
as discussed in Section 13.
63or rigor mathematicae, as D. Sherry put it in [143]
64Grattan-Guinness enunciates a historical reconstruction project in the name
of H. Freudenthal [61] in the following terms:
“it is mere feedback-style ahistory to read Cauchy (and contem-
poraries such as Bernard Bolzano) as if they had read Weierstrass
already. On the contrary, their own pre-Weierstrassian muddles
need historical reconstruction [71, p. 176].
The term “muddle” refers to an irreducible ambiguity of historical mathematics
such as Cauchy’s sum theorem of 1821.
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We will analyze the problem in more detail from the 19th century,
pre-Weierstrass, viewpoint of Cauchy’s textbooks. In Cauchy’s world,
a variable quantity q can have a “limiting” fixed quantity k, such that
the difference q − k is infinitesimal. Consider Cauchy’s decomposition
of an arbitrary infinitesimal of order n as a sum
kαn(1 + ǫ)
(see [33, p. 28]), where k is fixed nonzero, whereas ǫ is a variable quan-
tity representing an infinitesimal. If one were to set n = 0 in this
formula, one would obtain a representation of an an arbitrary finite
quantity q, as a sum
q = k + kǫ.
If we were to suppress the infinitesimal part kǫ, we would obtain “the
standard part” k of the original variable quantity q. In the terminology
of Section 13 we are dealing with a passage from a finite point of a B-
continuum, to the infinitely close (adequal) point of the A-continuum,
namely passing from a variable quantity to its limiting constant (fixed,
given) quantity.
Cauchy had the means at his disposal to resolve Berkeley’s query, so
as to solve the logical puzzle of the definition of the derivative in the
context of a B-continuum. While he did not resolve it, he did not need
the subtle and difficult idea of Weierstrassian epsilontics; suggesting
otherwise amounts to feedback-style ahistory.
This reader was shocked to discover, upon his first reading of chap-
ter 6 in Schubring [137], that Schubring is not aware of the fact that
Robinson’s non-standard numbers are an extension of the real numbers .
Consider the following three consecutive sentences from Schubring’s
chapter 6:
“[A] [Giusti’s 1984 paper] spurred Laugwitz to even more
detailed attempts to banish the error and confirm that
Cauchy had used hyper-real numbers.
[B] On this basis, he claims, the errors vanish and the
theorems become correct, or, rather, they always were
correct (see Laugwitz 1990, 21).
[C] In contrast to Robinson and his followers, Laugwitz
(1987) assumes that Cauchy did not use nonstandard
numbers in the sense of NSA, but that his infiniment
petits were infinitesimals representing an extension of
the field of real numbers” [137, p. 432].
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These three sentences, which we have labeled [A], [B], and [C], tell a
remarkable story that will allow us to gauge Schubring’s exact relation-
ship to the subject of his speculations. What interests us are the first
sentence [A] and the last sentence [C]. Their literal reading yields the
following four views put forth by Schubring: (1) Laugwitz intepreted
Cauchy as using hyperreal numbers (from sentence [A]); (2) Robinson
assumed that Cauchy used “nonstandard numbers in the sense of NSA”
(from sentence [C]); (3) Laugwitz disagreed with Robinson on the lat-
ter point (from sentence [C]); (4) Laugwitz interpreted Cauchy as using
an extension of the field of real numbers (from sentence [C]). Taken at
face value, items (1) and (4) together would logically indicate that (5)
Laugwitz interpreted Cauchy as using the hyperreal extension of the
reals; moreover, if, as indicated in item (3), Laugwitz disagreed with
Robinson, then it would logically follow that (6) Robinson interpreted
Cauchy as not using the hyperreal extension of the reals; as to the ques-
tion what number system Robinson did attribute to Cauchy, item (2)
would indicate that (7) Robinson used, not Laugwitz’s hyperreals, but
rather “nonstandard numbers in the sense of NSA”.
We hasten to clarify that all of the items listed above are incoherent.
Indeed, Robinson’s “non-standard numbers” and the hyperreals are
one and the same number system (see Section 15 for more details;
Robinson’s approach is actually more general than Hewitt’s hyperreal
fields). Meanwhile, Laugwitz’s preferred system is a different system
altogether, called Omega-calculus. We gather that Schubring literally
does not know what he is writing about when he takes on Robinson
and Laugwitz.
A reader interested in an introduction to Popper and fallibilism need
look no further than chapter 6 of Schubring [137], who comments on
the enthusiasm for revising traditional beliefs in the his-
tory of science and reinterpreting the discipline from
a theoretical, epistemological perspective generated by
Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) work on the structure of scien-
tific revolutions. Applying Popper’s favorite keyword of
fallibilism, the statements of earlier scientists that his-
toriography had declared to be false were particularly
attractive objects for such an epistemologically guided
revision.
The philosopher Imre Lakatos (1922-1972) was re-
sponsible for introducing these new approaches into the
history of mathematics. One of the examples he an-
alyzed and published in 1966 received a great deal of
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attention: Cauchy’s theorem and the problem of uni-
form convergence. Lakatos refines Robinson’s approach
by claiming that Cauchy’s theorem had also been correct
at the time, because he had been working with infinites-
imals [137, p. 431–432].
One might have expected that, having devoted so much space to the
philosophical underpinnings of Lakatos’ interpretation of Cauchy’s sum
theorem, Schubring would actually devote a thought or two to that in-
terpretation itself. Instead, Schubring presents a misguided claim to
the effect that Robinson acknowledged the incorrectness of the sum
theorem.65 Schubring appears to feel that calling Lakatos a Poppe-
rian and a fallibilist is sufficient refutation in its own right. Similarly,
Schubring dismisses Laugwitz’s reading of Cauchy as “solipsistic” [137,
p. 434]; accuses them of interpreting Cauchy’s conceptions as
some hermetic closure of a private mathematics [137,
p. 435] [emphasis in the original–the authors];
as well as being “highly anomalous or isolated” [137, p. 441]. Now
common sense would suggest that Laugwitz is interpreting Cauchy’s
words according to their plain meaning, and takes his infinitesimals at
face value. Isn’t the burden of proof on Schubring to explain why the
triumvirate interpretation of Cauchy is not “solipsistic”, “hermetic”,
or “anomalous”? Schubring does nothing of the sort.
Why are Lakatos and Laugwitz demonized rather than analyzed by
Schubring? The issue of whether or not Schubring commands a mini-
mum background necessary to understand either Robinson’s, Lakatos’,
or Laugwitz’s interpretation was discussed above. More fundamentally,
the act of contemplating for a moment the idea that Cauchy’s infinites-
imals can be taken at face value is unthinkable to a triumvirate histo-
rian, as it would undermine the nominalistic Cauchy-Weierstrass tale
65Schubring’s quote of Robinson’s reference to Cauchy’s “famous error” is taken
out of context. Note that the full quote is “a famous error of Cauchy’s, which has
been discussed repeatedly in the literature” (Robinson [131, p. 271]). Robinson de-
votes a lengthy paragraph on pages 260-261 to a statement of a received view of the
history of the calculus. Robinson then proceeds to refute the received view. Simi-
larly, the received, and famous, view (and one that “has been discussed repeatedly
in the literature”) is that Cauchy erred in his treatment of the sum theorem. Robin-
son proceeds to challenge such a view, by offering an interpretation that vindicates
Cauchy’s sum theorem, along the lines of Cauchy’s own modification/clarification
of 1853 (Cauchy [36]). Robinson’s interpretation is consistent with our position
that Cauchy’s 1821 result is irreducibly ambiguous, see also footnote 64. For a
summary of the controversy over the sum theorem, see Section 12.
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that the received historiography is erected upon. The failure to appre-
ciate the potency of the Robinson-Lakatos-Laugwitz interpretation is
symptomatic of an ostrich effect conditioned by a narrow A-continuum
vision.66 The Robinson-Lakatos-Laugwitz interpretation of Cauchy’s
sum theorem is considered in more detail in Section 12.
11. A case study in nominalistic hermeneutics
Chapter 6 in Schubring [137] is entitled “Cauchy’s compromise con-
cept”. Which compromise is the author referring to? The answer
becomes apparent on page 439, where the author quotes Cauchy’s “rec-
onciliation” sentence:
My main aim has been to reconcile rigor, which I have
made a law in my Cours d’Analyse, with the simplicity
that comes from the direct consideration of infinitely
small quantities (Cauchy 1823, see [34, p. 10]) [emphasis
added–authors].
Cauchy’s choice of the word “reconcile” does suggest a resolution of a
certain tension. What is the nature of such a tension? The sentence
mentions “rigor” and “infinitely small quantities” in the same breath.
This led Schubring to a conclusion of Cauchy’s alleged perception of a
“disagreement” between them:
In his next textbook on differential calculus in 1823,
Cauchy points out expressly that he has adopted a com-
promise concept and that the “simplicity of the infinitely
small quantities” [...] disagrees with the “rigor” that he
wished to achieve in his 1821 textbook [137, p. 439].
Schubring’s conclusion concerning such an alleged “disagreement”, as
well as the “compromise” of his title, both hinge essentially on a single
word concilier (reconcile) in Cauchy. Let us analyze its meaning. If it
refers to a disagreement between rigor and infinitesimals, how do we
account for Cauchy’s attribution, in 1821, of a fundamental founda-
tional role of infinitesimals in establishing a rigorous basis for analysis?
Had Cauchy changed his mind sometime between 1821 and 1823?
To solve the riddle we must place Cauchy’s “reconciliation” sentence
in the context where it occurs. In the sentence immediately preceding
it, Cauchy speaks of his break with the earlier texts in analysis:
66Such an effect is comparable to those occurring in the constructivist context,
see footnote 35, and in the educational context, see footnote 57.
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Les me´thodes que j’ai suivies diffe`rent a` plusieurs e´gards
de celles qui se trouvent expose´es dans les ouvrages du
meˆme genre [34, p. 10].
Could he be referring to his own earlier text? To answer the question,
we must read on what Cauchy has to say. Immediately following the
“reconciliation” sentence, Cauchy unleashes a sustained attack against
the flawed method of divergent power series. Cauchy does not name the
culprit, but clearly identifies the offending treatise. It is the Me´canique
Analytique, see (Cauchy 1823, p. 11). The second edition of Lagrange’s
treatise came out in 1811, when Cauchy was barely out of his teens.
Here Lagrange writes:
Lorsqu’on a bien conc¸u l’esprit de ce syste`me, et qu’on
s’est convaincu de l’exactitude de ses re´sultats par la
me´thode ge´ome´trique des premie`res et dernie`res raisons,
ou par la me´thode analytique des fonctions de´rive´es,
on peut employer les infiniment petits comme un in-
strument suˆr et commode pour abre´ger et simplifier les
de´monstrations [101, p. iv].
Lagrange’s ringing endorsement of infinitesimals in 1811 is as unam-
bivalent as that of Johann Bernoulli, l’Hopital, or Varignon. In re-
jecting Lagrange’s flawed method of power series, as well as his prin-
ciple of the “generality of algebra”, Cauchy was surely faced with a
dilemma with regard to Lagrange’s infinitesimals, which had stirred
controversy for over a century. We argue that it is the context of a
critical re-evaluation of Lagrange’s mathematics that created a tension
for Cauchy vis-a-vis Lagrange’s work of 1811: can he sift the chaff from
the grain?
Cauchy’s great accomplishment was his recognition that, while La-
grange’s flawed power series method and his principle of the generality
of algebra do not measure up to the standard of rigor Cauchy sought
to uphold in his own work, the infinitesimals can indeed be reconciled
with such a standard of rigor. The resolution of the tension between
the rejection of Lagrange’s conceptual framework, on the one hand,
and the acceptance of his infinitesimals, on the other, is what Cauchy
is referring to in his “reconciliation” sentence. Cauchy’s blending of
rigor and infinitesimals in 1823 is consistent with his approach in 1821.
Cauchy’s sentence compromises Schubring’s concept of a Cauchyan am-
bivalence with regard to infinitesimals, and pulls the rug from under
Schubring’s nominalistic and solipsistic reading of Cauchy.
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12. Cauchy’s sum theorem
In this section, we summarize the controversy over the sum theo-
rem, recently analyzed by Br˚ating [26]. The issue hinges on two types
of convergence. To clarify the mathematical issues involved, we will
first consider the simpler distinction between continuity and uniform
continuity. Let x be in the domain of a function f , and consider the
following condition, which we will call microcontinuity at x:
“if x′ is in the domain of f and x′ is infinitely close to x,
then f(x′) is infinitely close to f(x)”.
Then ordinary continuity of f is equivalent to f being microcontinuous
on the Archimedean continuum (A-continuum for short), i.e., at every
point x of its domain in the A-continuum. Meanwhile, uniform conti-
nuity of f is equivalent to f being microcontinuous on the Bernoulian
continuum (B-continuum for short), i.e., at every point x of its domain
in the B-continuum.67
Thus, the function
sin
1
x
for positive x fails to be uniformly continuous because microcontinuity
fails at a positive infinitesimal x. The function x2 fails to be uniformly
continuous because of the failure of microcontinuity at a single infinite
member of the B-continuum.
A similar distinction exists between pointwise convergence and uni-
form convergence. The latter condition requires convergence at the
points of the B-continuum in addition to the points of the A-continuum,
see e.g. Goldblatt [68, Theorem 7.12.2, p. 87].
Which condition did Cauchy have in mind in 1821? This is essentially
the subject of the controversy over the sum theorem.
Abel interpreted it as convergence on the A-continuum, and pre-
sented “exceptions” (what we would call today counterexamples) in
1826. After the publication of additional such exceptions by Seidel and
Stokes in the 1840s, Cauchy clarified/modified his position in 1853. In
his text [36], he specified a stronger condition of convergence on the
B-continuum, including at x = 1/n. The latter entity is explicitly men-
tioned by Cauchy as illustrating the failure of the error term to tend
to zero. The stronger condition bars Abel’s counterexample. See our
text [86] for more details.
67The relation of the two continua is discussed in more detail in Section 13.
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st

B-continuum
A-continuum
Figure 2. Thick-to-thin: taking standard part (the thick-
ness of the top line is merely conventional, and meant to
suggest the presence of additional numbers, such as in-
finitesimals)
13. Fermat, Wallis, and an “amazingly reckless” use of
infinity
A Leibnizian definition of the derivative as the infinitesimal quotient
∆y
∆x
,
whose logical weakness was criticized by Berkeley, was modified by
A. Robinson by exploiting a map called the standard part , denoted “st”,
from the finite part of a B-continuum (for “Bernoullian”), to the A-
continuum (for “Archimedean”), as illustrated in Figure 2.68 Here two
points of a B-continuum have the same image under “st” if and only if
they are equal up to an infinitesimal.
This section analyzes the historical seeds of Robinson’s theory, in
the work of Fermat, Wallis, as well as Barrow.69 The key concept
here is that of adequality (see below). It should be kept in mind that
Fermat never considered the local slope of a curve. Therefore one has
to be careful not to attribute to Fermat mathematical content that
could not be there. On the other hand, Barrow did study curves and
their slope. Furthermore, Barrow exploited Fermat’s adequality in his
work [9, p. 252], as documented by H. Breger [27, p. 198].
The binary relation of “equality up to an infinitesimal” was antic-
ipated in the work of Pierre de Fermat. Fermat used a term usually
translated into English as “adequality”.70 Andre´ Weil writes as follows:
68In the context of the hyperreal extension of the real numbers, the map “st”
sends each finite point x to the real point st(x) ∈ R infinitely close to x. In other
words, the map “st” collapses the cluster (halo) of points infinitely close to a real
number x, back to x.
69While Barrow’s role is also critical, we will mostly concentrate on Fermat and
Wallis.
70In French one uses ade´galite´, ade´gal , see [81, p. 73].
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Fermat [...] developed a method which slowly but surely
brought him very close to modern infinitesimal concepts.
What he did was to write congruences between func-
tions of x modulo suitable powers of x − x0; for such
congruences, he introduces the technical term adaequal-
itas, adaequare, etc., which he says he has borrowed
from Diophantus. As Diophantus V.11 shows, it means
an approximate equality, and this is indeed how Fer-
mat explains the word in one of his later writings [163,
p. 1146].
Weil [163, p. 1146, footnote 5] then supplies the following quote from
Fermat:
Adaequetur, ut ait Diophantus,71 aut fere aequetur ; in
Mr. Mahoney’s translation: “adequal, or almost equal”
(p. 246).
Here Weil is citing Mahoney [110, p. 246] (cf. [111, p. 247]). Mahoney
similarly mentions the meaning of “approximate equality” or “equality
in the limiting case” in [110, p. 164, end of footnote 46]. Mahoney
also points out that the term “adequality” in Fermat has additional
meanings. The latter are emphasized in a recent text by E. Giusti [67],
who is sharply critical of Breger [27]. While the review [163] by Weil is
similarly sharply critical of Mahoney, both agree that the meaning of
“approximate equality”, leading into infinitesimal calculus, is at least
one of the meanings of the term adequality for Fermat.72
This meaning was aptly summarized by J. Stillwell. Stillwell’s his-
torical presentation is somewhat simplified, and does not sufficiently
distinguish between the seeds actually present in Fermat, on the one
hand, and a modern interpretation thereof, on the other,73 but he does
a splendid job of explaining the mathematical background for the unini-
tiated. Thus, he notes that 2x+ dx is not equal to 2x (see Figure 1),
and writes:
Instead, the two are connected by a looser notion than
equality that Fermat called adequality. If we denote
71The original term in Diophantus is παρισo´της , see Weil [164, p. 28].
72Jensen similarly describes adequality as approximate equality, and describes
neglected terms as infinitesimals in [81, p. 82]. Struik notes that “Fermat uses
the term to denote what we call a limiting process” [150, p. 220, footnote 5].
K. Barner [8] compiled a useful bibliography on Fermat’s adequality, including
many authors we have not mentioned here.
73See main text around footnote 69 above for a discussion of Barrow’s role,
documented by H Breger.
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Figure 3. Zooming in on Wallis’s infinitesimal 1
∞
, which
is adequal to 0 in Fermat’s terminology
adequality by =ad, then it is accurate to say that
2x+ dx =ad 2x,
and hence that dy/dx for the parabola is adequal to 2x.
Meanwhile, 2x + dx is not a number, so 2x is the only
number to which dy/dx is adequal. This is the true sense
in which dy/dx represents the slope of the curve [148,
p. 91].
Stillwell points out that
Fermat introduced the idea of adequality in 1630s but
he was ahead of his time. His successors were unwilling
to give up the convenience of ordinary equations, prefer-
ring to use equality loosely rather than to use adequal-
ity accurately. The idea of adequality was revived only
in the twentieth century, in the so-called non-standard
analysis [148, p. 91].
We will refer to the map from the (finite part of the) B-continuum to
the A-continuum as the Fermat-Robinson standard part, see Figure 3.
As far as the logical criticism formulated by Rev. George is con-
cerned, Fermat’s adequality had pre-emptively provided the seeds of
an answer, a century before the bishop ever lifted up his pen to write
The Analyst [13].
Fermat’s contemporary John Wallis, in a departure from Cavalieri’s
focus on the geometry of indivisibles, emphasized the arithmetic of
infinitesimals, see J. Stedall’s introduction in [162]. To Cavalieri, a
plane figure is made of lines; to Wallis, it is made of parallelograms
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Figure 4. Area calculations in Wallis: slicing it up into
dilatable parallelograms of infinitesimal altitude
of infinitesimal altitude. Wallis transforms this insight into symbolic
algebra over the ∞ symbol which he introduced. He exploits formulas
like∞× 1
∞
= 1 in his calculations of areas. Thus, in proposition 182 of
Arithmetica Infinitorum, Wallis partitions a triangle of altitude A and
base B into a precise number ∞ of “parallelograms” of infinitesimal
width A
∞
, see Figure 4 (copied from [117, p. 170]).
He then computes the combined length of the bases of the parallel-
ograms to be B
2
∞, and finds the area to be
A
∞ ×
B
2
∞ = AB
2
. (13.1)
Wallis used an actual infinitesimal 1
∞
in calculations as if it were an
ordinary number, anticipating Leibniz’s law of continuity.
Wallis’s area calculation (13.1) is reproduced by J. Scott, who notes
that Wallis
treats infinity as though the ordinary rules of arithmetic
could be applied to it [138, p. 20].
Such a treatment of infinity strikes Scott as something of a blemish, as
he writes:
But this is perhaps understandable. For many years
to come the greatest confusion regarding these terms
persisted, and even in the next century they continued
to be used in what appears to us an amazingly reckless
fashion [138, p. 21].
What is the source of Scott’s confidence in dismissing Wallis’s use of
infinity as “reckless”? Scott identifies it on the preceding page of his
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book; it is, predictably, the triumvirate “modern conception of infin-
ity” [138, p. 19]. Scott’s tunnel A-continuum vision blinds him to
the potential of Wallis’s vision of infinity. But this is perhaps under-
standable. Many years separate Scott from Robinson’s theory which
in particular empowers Wallis’s calculation. The lesson of Scott’s con-
descending steamrolling of Wallis’s infinitesimal calculation could be
taken to heart by historians who until this day cling to a nominalis-
tic belief that Robinson’s theory has little relevance to the history of
mathematics in the 17th century.
14. Conclusion
Nominalism in the narrow sense defines its ontological target as the
ordinary numbers. Burgess in his essay [30] suggests that there is also
a nominalism in a broader sense. Thus, he quotes at length Manin’s
criticism of constructivism, suggesting that LEM-elimination can also
fall under the category of a nominalism understood in a broader sense.
In a later text [31, p. 30], Burgess discusses Brouwer under a similar
angle.
Infinitesimals were largely eliminated from mathematical discourse
starting in the 1870s through the efforts of the great triumvirate.74 The
elimination took place under the banner of striving for greater rigor,75
but the roots of the triumvirate reconstruction lay in a failure to provide
a solid foundation for a B-continuum (see Section 13). Had actually
useful mathematics been sacrificed on the altar of “mathematical rigor”
during the second half of the 19th century?
Today we can give a precise sense to C.S. Peirce’s description of the
real line as a pseudo-continuum.76
Cantor’s revolutionary advances in set theory went hand-in-hand
with his emotional opposition to infinitesimals as an “abomination”
74See footnote 3.
75See Vicenti and Bloor [161] for an analysis of rigor in 19th century mathemat-
ics. See also our Section 7.
76American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce felt that a construction of a
true continuum necessarily involves infinitesimals. He wrote as follows: “But I
now define a pseudo-continuum as that which modern writers on the theory of
functions call a continuum. But this is fully represented by [...] the totality of real
values, rational and irrational” [121] (see CP 6.176, 1903 marginal note. Here, and
below, CP x.y stands for Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume x,
paragraph y). Peirce used the word “pseudo-continua” to describe real numbers in
the syllabus (CP 1.185) of his lectures on Topics of Logic. Thus, Peirce’s intuition of
the continuum corresponded to a type of a B-continuum (see Section 13), whereas
an A-continuum to him was a pseudo-continuum.
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and the “cholera bacillus” of mathematics. Cantor’s interest in elim-
inating infinitesimals is paralleled nearly a century later by Bishop’s
interest in eliminating LEM, and by a traditional nominalist’s interest
in eliminating Platonic counting numbers. The automatic infinitesimal-
to-limit translation as applied to Cauchy by Boyer and others is not
only reductionist, but also self-contradictory, see [86].
15. Rival continua
This section summarizes a 20th century implementation of the B-
continuum, not to be confused with incipient notions of such a con-
tinuum found in earlier centuries. An alternative implementation has
been pursued by Lawvere, John L. Bell [11, 12], and others.
We illustrate the construction by means of an infinite-resolution
microscope in Figure 3. We will denote such a B-continuum by the
new symbol IIR (“thick-R”). Such a continuum is constructed in for-
mula (15.4). We will also denote its finite part, by
IIR<∞ = {x ∈ IIR : |x| <∞} ,
so that we have a disjoint union
IIR = IIR<∞ ∪ IIR∞, (15.1)
where IIR∞ consists of unlimited hyperreals (i.e., inverses of nonzero
infinitesimals).
The map “st” sends each finite point x ∈ IIR, to the real point
st(x) ∈ R infinitely close to x, as follows:77
IIR<∞
st

R
Robinson’s answer to Berkeley’s logical criticism (see D. Sherry [143])
is to define the derivative as
st
(
∆y
∆x
)
,
instead of ∆y/∆x.
Note that both the term “hyper-real field”, and an ultrapower con-
struction thereof, are due to E. Hewitt in 1948, see [76, p. 74]. In 1966,
Robinson referred to the
77This is the Fermat-Robinson standard part whose seeds in Fermat’s adequality
were discussed in Appendix 13.
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(
QN
/Fu)<∞   //
st


IIR<∞
st


Q //
)
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♠
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R
≃
// R
Figure 5. An intermediate field QN
/Fu is built directly
out of Q
theory of hyperreal fields (Hewitt [1948]) which ... can
serve as non-standard models of analysis [131, p. 278].
The transfer principle is a precise implementation of Leibniz’s heuristic
law of continuity : “what succeeds for the finite numbers succeeds also
for the infinite numbers and vice versa”, see [131, p. 266]. The trans-
fer principle, allowing an extention of every first-order real statement
to the hyperreals, is a consequence of the theorem of J.  Los´ in 1955,
see [106], and can therefore be referred to as a Leibniz- Los´ transfer prin-
ciple. A Hewitt- Los´ framework allows one to work in a B-continuum
satisfying the transfer principle. To elaborate on the ultrapower con-
struction of the hyperreals, let QN denote the ring of sequences of
rational numbers. Let (
QN
)
C
denote the subspace consisting of Cauchy sequences. The reals are by
definition the quotient field
R :=
(
QN
)
C
/Fnull, (15.2)
where Fnull contains all null sequences. Meanwhile, an infinitesimal-
enriched field extension of Q may be obtained by forming the quotient
QN
/Fu.
Here a sequence 〈un : n ∈ N〉 is in Fu if and only if the set of indices
{n ∈ N : un = 0}
is a member of a fixed ultrafilter.78 See Figure 5.
To give an example, the sequence〈
(−1)n
n
〉
(15.3)
78In this construction, every null sequence defines an infinitesimal, but the con-
verse is not necessarily true. Modulo suitable foundational material, one can ensure
that every infinitesimal is represented by a null sequence; an appropriate ultrafilter
(called a P-point) will exist if one assumes the continuum hypothesis, or even the
weaker Martin’s axiom. See Cutland et al [39] for details.
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represents a nonzero infinitesimal, whose sign depends on whether or
not the set 2N is a member of the ultrafilter. To obtain a full hyperreal
field, we replace Q by R in the construction, and form a similar quotient
IIR := RN
/Fu. (15.4)
We wish to emphasize the analogy with formula (15.2) defining the
A-continuum. Note that, while the leftmost vertical arrow in Figure 5
is surjective, we have (
QN/Fu
) ∩ R = Q.
A more detailed discussion of this construction can be found in the
book by M. Davis [45]. See also B laszczyk [21] for some philosophi-
cal implications. More advanced properties of the hyperreals such as
saturation were proved later, see Keisler [94] for a historical outline.
A helpful “semicolon” notation for presenting an extended decimal ex-
pansion of a hyperreal was described by A. H. Lightstone [105]. See
also P. Roquette [134] for infinitesimal reminiscences. A discussion of
infinitesimal optics is in K. Stroyan [149], J. Keisler [93], D. Tall [154],
and L. Magnani and R. Dossena [109, 48], and Bair & Henry [7].
Applications of the B-continuum range from aid in teaching calculus
[54, 84, 85, 155, 156] (see illustration in Figure 1) to the Bolzmann
equation (see L. Arkeryd [4, 5]); modeling of timed systems in computer
science (see H. Rust [135]); mathematical economics (see Anderson [3]);
mathematical physics (see Albeverio et al. [1]); etc.
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